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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Robert D.
Critchfield's motion for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June 2008, a 12-year-old Couer d'Alene girl reported to police that her
neighbor, Robert Critchfield, touched her inappropriately over a period of four to
six months.

(R., Vol. I, pp.32-35, 41-42, 67.)

The girl also told police that

Critchfield had exposed her to pornography, and had called her, along with other
neighborhood girls, into his bedroom while he was masturbating. (Id.)

Over the

next few days, police spoke to approximately eight other neighborhood girls who
made

similar

allegations

against

Critchfield.

(R.,

Vol.

I,

pp.35-68.)

After several amendments to the information, the state ultimately charged
Critchfield with seven counts of sex abuse, and two counts of lewd and lascivious
conduct. (R., Vol. III, pp.509-512.) The charges involved nine separate victims.
(Id.) At trial, the state called, in total, nine witnesses - the nine victims. (Trial Tr.,
p.95, L.5 - p.535, L.9.)

No law enforcement officers or state experts testified,

and no audio recordings of the investigators' victim interviews were admitted into
evidence. (See generally, Trial Tr.)
During Critchfield's case-in-chief, he attempted to call expert witness Dr.
Gregory Wilson. (Trial Tr., p.901, Ls.10-22.) According to Critchfield's offer of
proof made during the trial, Dr. Wilson would have testified about proper
1

protocols that law enforcement officers should employ when interviewing child
victims of sex abuse, and about the risk of improper suggestion in such
interviews if those protocols are not followed. (R., Vol. III, pp.563-564; Trial Tr.,
p.1412, L.12 - p.1440, L.8.) Further, Dr. Wilson would have specifically critiqued
the victim interviews conducted by law enforcement officers in this case. (Id.)
Following the state's objection, and argument over several days, the
district court excluded Dr. Wilson's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.901, L.10 - p.909, L.9;
p.1110, L.20 - p.1149, LA; p.1179, L.24 - p.1202, L.8.) The court determined
that because none of the law enforcement officers who conducted the interviews
testified at trial, and because the content of the interviews was not in evidence,
such testimony was irrelevant and invaded the province of the jury. (ld.)
The jury found Critchfield guilty of one count of sex abuse, and one count
of lewd and lascivious conduct. (R., Vol. III, p.551.) The jury acquitted Critchfield
of four of the sex abuse counts.

(R., Vol. III, pp.551-552.)

The district court

declared a mistrial on the three remaining counts, after the jury was unable to
reach unanimous verdicts on those counts. (R., Vol. III, pp.551-552, 579-580.)
Critchfield then filed a motion for a new trial. (R., Vol. III, pp.560-565; 571578.) Among other grounds, Critchfield requested a new trial on the basis of the
district court's exclusion of Dr. Wilson's testimony.

(Id.)

The district court

granted Critchfield's motion, determining that it was error to exclude Dr. Wilson's

2

testimony at trial. (R., Vol. III, pp.591-592; 12/16/10 Tr., p.53, L.23 - p.63, L.9.)
The state timely appealed. (2/10/11 State's "Notice of AppeaL") 1

1 Simultaneous with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment
the record with the 2/10/11 Notice of Appeal.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting a new trial because no
reversible error occurred in the trial?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Granting Critchfield's Motion For A
New Trial
A.

Introduction
At trial, the district court properly excluded the testimony of proffered

defense expert Dr. Wilson, who would have discussed child sex abuse victim
interview protocols, and critiqued the interviews conducted by law enforcement
officers in this case.

Because none of the law enforcement officers who

interviewed the victims testified at trial, and because the interviews themselves
were not in evidence, such testimony would have necessarily amounted to an
improper determination of trial witness credibility, and invaded the province of the
jury. The district court therefore abused its discretion in later finding an error of
law in its exclusion of the testimony, and in granting Critchfield's motion for a new
tria!.

B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's

discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley,
119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991).

C.

The District Court Erred In Granting Critchfield's Motion For A New Trial
Idaho law permits a district court to order a new trial if the court has "erred

in the decision of any question of law arising during the course of the tria!." I.C. §

5

19-2406(5).

Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the standard that the trial court

applies when considering a motion for a new trial, directing that "[t]he court ...
may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice."
Whether the interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent a
showing of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64,
122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005).

When a district court orders a new trial

based on I.C. § 19-2406(5), a reviewing appellate court will determine first
whether the evidentiary ruling at trial in question was erroneous, and, if so,
whether that error was harmless, i.e., whether the Court is confident beyond a
reasonable doubt that, had the evidentiary error not occurred, the verdict would
have been the same. State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 820-821, 54 P.3d 460,
463-464 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 923 P.2d 439
(1996)). Therefore, a district court manifestly abuses its discretion if it orders a
new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(5), if either: (1) the evidentiary ruling at trial
in question was not erroneous, or (2) the evidentiary ruling at trial in question was
erroneous, but the error was harmless.
1. The District Court's Exclusion Of Dr. Wilson's Testimony At Trial Was
Not Erroneous
Expert testimony is admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75,81,
175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also LR.E. 702; However,
"Idaho courts have routinely held that an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is

6

admissible up to the pOint where an expression of opinion would require the
expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed
evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury's function.
It is the jury's function to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and make a
determination of credibility." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230,
1235 (2003) (citing State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988);
State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 419, 3 P.3d 535, 544 (Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Allen, 123 Idaho 880, 885, 85 P .2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 1993)).

Further,

"statements by a witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth are
prohibited." Perry, 139 Idaho at 525, 81 P.3d at 1235 (quoting Allen, 123 Idaho
at 885, 853 P.2d at 630.)
In this case, as the district court initially concluded, Critchfield's proffered
expert testimony would have necessarily and improperly commented on the
credibility of the testifying victims, and invaded the province of the jury.

The

interviews themselves were not in evidence, none of the law enforcement officers
who conducted the interviews testified at trial, and the state did not call any
expert witnesses to discuss either the interviews specifically, or child sex abuse
victim interviews generally. Critchfield, in essence, was not seeking to utilize Dr.
Wilson's testimony to simply "assist" the jurors in their evaluation of the
interviews, as permitted by I.R.E. 702, he was seeking to implore the jurors to
conclude, based solely on Dr. Wilson's expert testimony, that the interviews were
not only improperly suggestive, but actually caused the witnesses to testify

7

falsely at trial.

The district court correctly determined that this would be

impermissible.
It is true that in other jurisdictions there is an emerging trend to allow
defense experts to describe proper methods that should be used to interview
child sex abuse victims, and to critique law enforcement interviews that fall short
of these standards.

See State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233, 239 (Vt. 2005)

(recognizing that "a large majority of courts have held that the type of general
expert evidence introduced in this case, explaining the proper and improper
methods of examining children who may be victims of sexual assault, is
admissible") (citations omitted).

However, these cases typically analyze the

admissibility of this type of defense expert testimony in terms of rebutting state
expert testimony regarding the procedures actually used in the interviews in
question, or as a tool to explain and provide assistance to juries in their analysis
of recordings or other evidence of interviews actually admitted into evidence. In
other words, these cases have held that defense experts may provide expert
opinions to assist jurors in analyzing victim interviews that are, in some way,
actually in evidence.

See,~,

State v. Sloan, 912 S.W.2d 592, 594-599 (Mo.

App. E.D. 1995) (State officials testified at trial about the victim interviews they
conducted, and about their training and experience to conduct such interviews.
The U[d]efendant offered to prove [that these state officials], gave testimony that
was not probative of guilt because they used faulty techniques or methods in
dealing with the child."); State v. Gersin, 668 N.E.2d 486, 487-489 (Ohio 1996)
(recognizing that the deputy who conducted the victim interview testified at trial,
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and that "prosecution witnesses relied upon [victim's] interviews in their
testimony"); Barlow v. State, 507 S.E.2d. 416, 417-419 (Ga. 1998) ("Indeed, the
State in this case clothed the [victim] interviewer with expertise by eliciting
testimony that he had extensive experience and training in investigating child
sexual abuse and interviewing the victims thereof. Thus, as Barlow correctly
observes, the exclusion of his expert's testimony produced an 'uneven playing
field.' Allowing expert opinion testimony that the police detective in this case
used improper interview techniques 'represent[ed] a direct response to expert
opinion offered by the state."') (citations omitted); u.S. v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561,
570-572 (8 th Cir. 2001) (FBI agent who conducted victim interviews testified at
trial); Pyron v. State, 514 S.E.2d 51, 52-54 (Ga. App. 1999) (the state tendered a
videotape of victim interview into evidence); State v. Sargent, 738 A.2d 351, 352354 (N.H. 1999) (The defendant cross-examined victim witnesses with evidence
that they had delayed disclosure of the abuse, made inconsistent statements,
and recanted prior statements.

The state then called an expert witness to

discuss child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, and to address the
subjects raised on cross-examination of the victims. The defendant then sought
to call an expert to rebut the state expert, specifically by discussing the danger of
improperly-conducted interviews of children.); State v. Hakala, 763 N.W.2d 346,
348, 350-353 (Minn. App. 2009) ("The social worker testified about her training
for interviewing children who have allegedly been sexually abused, as well as the
proper protocol for interviewing such children. She concluded by discussing her
interviews with the alleged victims here. In addition to live testimony by the

9

victims, the taped interviews between the social worker and the victims were also
played for the jury."); See also State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 330-334 (Iowa
1992) (Where officials who conducted victim interviews testified, but the
interviews themselves were not in evidence, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in disallowing defense expert from specifically critiquing procedures
used in interviewing the victims.

"The court could reasonably conclude that

without the interview in evidence, there was no fact in issue that [the defense
expert's] testimony would aid the jury in better understanding.") (Citation
omitted).
Thus, while defendants may be permitted to call expert witnesses to assist
the jury in making credibility determinations from evidence actually admitted at
trial, or to rebut state witness testimony from experts and law enforcement
officials that conducted the interviews, it does not follow that a defendant may
utilize a defense expert to testify, in the absence of such evidence, that victim
interviews were suggestive. Such testimony necessarily invades the province of
the jury.
In this case, Critchfield, despite having subpoenaed the police officers
who conducted the victim interviews, and arranging for them to be at the
courthouse during the trial (Trial Tr., p.826, Ls.1 0-13), elected not to call them as
witnesses. Critchfield also declined to move to suppress the victim testimony on
the grounds that it was tainted by improper suggestion. Finally, he also declined
to attempt to have admitted, as evidence, audio recordings of the actual victim
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interviews. 2 Instead, Critchfield elected to attempt to present to the jury only Dr.
Wilson's testimony that the police interviews were flawed. 3

Such testimony

would be useful for no other purpose than to persuade the jurors to conclude that
the witnesses testified falsely, based on nothing more than the expert's
testimony.

Faced with Dr. Wilson's testimony, but no interview evidence upon

which to apply it, the jury would have two choices. It could either disregard Dr.
Wilson's testimony and rely on its own credibility determinations, or it could have
blindly accepted his conclusions and inferred that the victims testified falsely at

2 Critchfield did submit transcripts of the interviews, which he had created from
the interview audio recordings, as part of his offer of proof. (Trial Tr., p.1437,
Ls.11-19; Defendant's Exhibit 8.) Even if Dr. Wilson had testified, however,
Critchfield would not have been able to authenticate or lay proper foundation for
admission of the interview transcripts or audio recordings through him.
Critchfield would, however, likely have been able to admit the recordings through
the police officers who had conducted the interviews.
See Jenkins v.
Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Ky. 2010) (recognizing, in dicta, that trial
court erred by denying the defendant's motion to admit recordings of the victim
interview during defense cross-examination of the officer who conducted the
interview).

3Critchfield's decision to attempt to rely solely on Dr. Wilson's defense expert
testimony may have been based on his perception of the state's lack of
preparation to rebut such testimony. In addition to its relevance objection, the
state objected to Dr. Wilson's testimony on the grounds of late and improper
disclosure. (Trial Tr., p.901, L.10 - p.902, L.17, p.1117, L.7 - p.1121, L.11.)
Critchfield did not disclose Dr. Wilson as a witness until two weeks prior to trial,
and never provided the state, or the district court, information about the
anticipated content of Dr. Wilson's testimony until after he was called as a
witness. (ld.) Critchfield argued that the disclosure was sufficiently timely, and
that the state never specifically requested that Critchfield disclose the content of
Dr. Wilson's expert testimony pursuant to I.C.R. 16(7). (Trial Tr., p.904, L.4 p.906, L.2, p.1121, L.12 - p.1125, L.17.) Because the district court excluded Dr.
Wilson's testimony on relevance grounds, it did not rule on the state's discovery
objection.
11

trial. Admission of such evidence would thus clearly invade the province of the
jury.
2. Even If The District Court's Evidentiary Ruling That Excluded Dr.
Wilson's Testimony At Trial Was Erroneous, Such Error Was Harmless
As discussed above, a district court manifestly abuses its discretion when
it grants a motion for a new trial based on an error of law at trial pursuant to I.C. §
19-2406(5), when any such trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Howell, 137 Idaho at 820-821,54 P.3d at 463-464; Roberts, 129 Idaho at 197199, 923 P.2d at 442-444.

In this case, even if the district court should have

permitted Dr. Wilson to testify at trial, any error in the exclusion of Dr. Wilson's
testimony was harmless.
Should this Court find that Dr. Wilson should have been permitted to
testify generally about proper protocols that should be used in interviewing child
sex abuse victims, but not offer specific critiques of the interviews conducted in
this case, then such error is clearly harmless. In such an instance, the jury would
be left with expert opinion about proper interview protocols, but little or no
information about what protocols were actually used in this case (as discussed
above, such evidence would also be irrelevant, for similar reasons).
If instead, this Court finds that Dr. Wilson should have been permitted to
testify generally about proper interview protocols, as well as offer specific
critiques of the interviews conducted in this case, the jury still would not have
been able to utilize his testimony to analyze the respective victim interviews
directly.

Having convicted Critchfield on counts I and III (victims D.L.M. and
12

K.R.S.), acquitted him on counts V, VII, VIII, and IX (victims AM.L., M.L.B.,
C.R.D., and D.AG.), and failed to reach unanimous verdicts on counts II, IV, and
VI (victims I.M.L., H.A, and K.M.T.) (R., Vol. III, pp.509-512, 551-552), the jury
necessarily made credibility determinations in favor of some of the victims, and
against others, based on their testimony.

It is unlikely the jury would have

abandoned its credibility-finding role entirely, and relied exclusively on the
testimony of Dr. Wilson to collectively acquit, or fail to reach a verdict, on all nine
charges, involving nine separate victims.
At trial, the district court properly concluded that the testimony of Dr.
Wilson was inadmissible. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when
it incorrectly determined that this original ruling constituted an error of law, and
granted Critchfield's motion for a new trial. Even if the district court should have
permitted Dr. Wilson to testify, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt in light of the lack of evidence the jury had at its disposal with which to
utilize the testimony.

This Court should therefore reverse the district court's

order granting Critchfield's motion for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order granting Critchfield's motion for a new trial, reinstate the impacted verdicts,
and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of November 2011.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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